

**TALIBANIZATION AND MILITARY OPERATION RAH-E-RAST; THE FINAL  
KNOCKBACK IN SWAT**

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**Abstract**

*After gaining superior positions, Taliban challenged the writ of the government and the whole administration in Swat was paralyzed. To combat the rising militant threat and to establish the writ of the government operation Rah-e-Haq was launched in November, 2007. The operation consisted of three phases, but they all ended without much success. Finally the Pakistan Army launched an offensive operation called Rah-e-Rast. The operation remained very successful. The security forces very tactfully disassembled the terrorist net work in Swat. Fearing for their lives nearly 2.7 million people fled the area and settled either with their relatives, at government schools or in officially established camps. Moreover, the conflict has negatively affected the national character of Pakistan as a whole. It is a review paper and based on secondary literature. This paper mainly concentrates on the role performed by the security forces of Pakistan under the shadow of Operation Rah-e- Rast.*

**Keywords:** Rah-e- Nijat, Rah-e- Rast, Fazlullah, Operation, Dismantle, Security forces.

**BACKGROUND**

A steady militant phase developed in the Swat valley and its surroundings after 9/11. The movement was disorganized in comparison to the tribal belt, particularly in North and South Waziristan. However, as the militants grew in strength and influence in the Swat valley, Maulana Fazlullah organized a Shura (council). The council was composed of individuals with strong verbal powers and an adversarial demeanor. A neighbor of Fazlullah, Sirajuddin was the movement's first representative and was also member of Jaish e Mohammad. (A militant group located in Kashmir.). At the end of 2007, Muslim Khan, a Swat local, succeeded him (Majeed, 2016). Muslim Khan was a vocal supporter of TTS. In the early 1990s, he worked with Maulana Sufi Muhammad and gained vast experience in this subject. Fazlullah presided over the council, which had between 35 and 45 members. Fazlullah served as the supreme commander in chief on the council. Separate armed fighting units were also established in each

hamlet under the command of Amir or Amir Saib. Numerous fighters worked in the village under Amir's supervision. Amir was Fazlullah's representative and was ultimately responsible for the militants' activities. The council members were separated into separate detachments of fighters. Suicide bombers, foot soldiers, trainers, and other elite commandos were further subdivided among the armed combatants (Saddique, 2010).

Fazlullah organized Shaheen Commandos, a force of severe nature, in early 2008, when the movement was at its peak. Their responsibilities included prohibiting women from leaving their homes without a full veil, searching for musical instruments in transport vehicles, closing cinema houses, shutting down barbershops and music stores, ordering general stores to close during prayer times, as well as arcades selling women's garments, among other things (Banori, 2007).

Shah Dawran, Fazlullah's Deputy Chief, was an outspoken and unpleasant individual. He consistently stood up to government authority with pride and zeal, but he died at the end of 2009 from kidney failure. Maulana Muhammad Alam Binori, Sirajuddin Muslim Khan, Mahmoud Khan and Ibn-e-Amin were among the council members who turn into prominent (Dawn, 2009). Fazlullah had developed links with Pakistan's Tahreek Taliban. Baitullah Mehsud created the TTP in December 2007. It served as a coordinating body for all Taliban groups in Pakistan. Fazlullah had close ties to Baitullah Mehsud and Mullah Omer, the Afghan Taliban's leader. Fazlullah revealed in an interview:

*"I just informed my supporters to be prepared for Jihad. Whatever has begun in Swat has nothing to do with my announcement, but rather with the government operation at Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa. Every Pakistani is responsible for rising up in arms against those who bomb their own people"* (Khattak, 2010).

The Swat Taliban openly opposed the government's authority, prompting a succession of military operations to rid the valley of insurgents.

### **FIRST STAGE OF MILITARY OPERATION RAH-E-HAQ (Right Path)**

The operation was conducted in three stages. On October 24, 2007, the provincial government declared the launch of the first military operation, Rah-e-Haq, against Fazlullah and his armed outfit. The operation's objective was to dislodge Fazlullah as well as his partners from Swat, where they'd set up a rival government (The News, 2007). During the initial phase of the operation, the government promised that there would not be any extremist activities in Swat by December 2007. Swat locals greeted military action against militants with enthusiasm and support. In November, fighting between government troops and the Taliban resumed (Noor, 2009).

On November 3, 2007, 120 members of the Matta police force and paramilitary personnel put down their arms. Additionally, the Taliban gained control of Khwazakhela Tehsil, seizing two police stations and firearms. They also took over Chota Kalam, a tourist attraction in

Ningolai. In the Tehsils of Kabal, Matta, and Khwazakhela, Taliban created their own checkpoints and nominated their own "Amirs and Governors" (Azra, 2009).

The Taliban withdrew from practically all government buildings and public venues they had held in December 2007, including the Mamdherai Markaz. Fazlullah and his supporters fled to nearby mountains and continued their attacks until an Awami National Party (ANP)-led provincial government gained power in early 2008 (Daily Times, 2008)

### **THE ANP-LED ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT**

General Elections were held in Pakistan in February 2008. Awami National Party-led alliance government was formed NWFP (KP). ANP's electoral slogan was "restoration of peace." The provincial government met with Fazlullah and Sufi Muhammad, and in April 2008, the provincial government released Sufi Muhammad as a display of goodwill (Bangash, 2012).

Along with other pledges, the government pledged to uphold Islamic Laws in accordance with the requests of Fazlullah and Sufi Muhammad, who in turn agreed to help the government in its noble efforts to restore peace and maintain law and order, among other things (Rome, 2011). However, conflicts quickly erupted over a number of areas. Each side accused the other of breaching the deal, thus straining ties and precipitating new military conflicts (Rome, 2011).

### **SECOND STAGE OF MILITARY OPERATION RAH-E-HAQ (Right Path)**

Two months later, 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of the military operation Rah-e-Haq commenced. Fazlullah adamantly demanded that the government withdraw before its fighters laid down their arms. While the government authorities were not ready to accept such unprincipled demand. Fazlullah quickly renounced the May 21 agreement and directed his armed Taliban to assault security forces. By assassinating two local junior police officers in Matta, the Taliban took the first step toward violating the agreement. On June 29, 2008, the army immediately initiated the second phase of military Operation Rah-e-Haq (Fleischner, 2011).

Prominent Taliban leaders like as Tor Mullah and Ali Bakht were assassinated during this operation. The Taliban stepped up their violent activities, which included assassinating targets, attacking security personnel, and bombing government buildings, educational institutions, police stations, and bridges. Moreover, the Taliban assaulted the PTDC Motel, Pakistan's only ski resort.

### **THIRD STAGE OF MILITARY OPERATION RAH-E-HAQ (Right Path)**

In January 2009, 3<sup>rd</sup> phase of operation Rah-e-Haq commenced. By January 2009, despite the presence of over 20,000 Pakistani troops, Swat was effectively under militant control. Taliban bombed five government schools in Mingora in January 2009. On January 21, 2009, the Militant declared an outright ban on female education in Swat. Fazlullah also summoned eighty-six notable persons to appear before his Shoorah, including lawmakers, Cabinet Ministers, and members of the National and Provincial Assembly (Council). General Pervez

Kiyani, Chief of the Army Staff, arrived in Swat at the end of January 2009. Gen. Kiyani has decided to combat insurgents until peace is restored in Swat valley (Azra, 2009). After thorough and in-depth meetings, Swat Peace accord was signed by the provincial government of ANP with the prominent leadership of Swat Taliban.

### **SWAT PEACE ACCORD 2009**

When the PATA regulation was repealed, demands were made for the installation of Sharia in Swat. Sharia was implemented throughout Malakand in 1994, although not in its literal sense. In 1999, a few proclamations were made, but they were not followed through on. Swat's peace deteriorated in 2006. Sufi Muhammad was released in April 2007 as part of a settlement brokered by the regional authorities. As a result, on 16 February 2009, the provincial government of NWFP and the TNSM founder Sufi Muhammad signed the Swat peace accord (Cloughley, 2009).

### **TEXT OF SWAT PEACE ACCORD (February 16, 2009)**

- Sharia law will be implemented in Swat, which encompasses the entirety of Malakand.
- Captives will be exchanged between the Taliban and the government.
- Gradual withdrawal of security forces from Swat and Malakand division.
- The Taliban will recognize the authority of the government and will cooperate with local law enforcement.
- The Taliban's attacks on barbershops and music centers will immediately cease.
- The Taliban will surrender to the government heavier weapons, such as rocket launchers and mortars.
- The Taliban will not display their weapons publicly.
- The Taliban will collaborate with the government to vaccinate children against diseases like Polio.
- The Taliban will express their opposition to suicide bombings.
- In Imam Dherai, Fazlullah's Madrasa will be converted into an Islamic University.
- The Taliban will allow women to work without fear.
- Participation in the region would be limited to licensed FM radio stations.
- Private militias would be prohibited.
- No Taliban training camps will exist (Frontier Post, 2009).
- It was somewhat surprising that Afghanistan, India, and the United States all had particularly hostile reactions to the peace pact. This substantially justified external elements' participation and wagers. New Delhi expressed concern about the Talibanization of Pakistan, stating that the Swat accord "had a global resonance" (Daily Times, 2009).

**THE NIZAM-E-ADAL REGULATION 2009**

In the mid of April 2009, Asif Ali Zardari who was the president of Pakistan at that time signed the "Nizam-e-Adal Regulation." In accord with Pakistan's state constitution article 247, the provincial government of the then-Northwest Frontier Province passed the Sharia Nizam-e-Adal Regulation 2009. Islam's rulings as contained in the Holy Quran, Sunnah-e-Nabvi, Qiyas, and Ijma are Shariah. It establishes a system for selecting Qazis (Judicial Authorities) who are knowledgeable in Islamic Shariah. Development of this plan come from two court of appeal, Dar-ul-Qaza and Dar-ul-Darul-Qaza, each having appeals powers equivalent to the High Court and the Supreme Court. There were also five judges: Executive Court, Zila qazi, Izafi qazi, Alla qazi, Illaqa qazi (Kronstadt, 2010).

Due to the implementation of NAR, few institutes and education centers, mainly those for women, opened. Schoolgirls and women, on the other hand, were intended to manage themselves fully in line with Islamic Shariah.

"Swat did not really have Sharia laws; instead, it had 'Taliban rule,' which was against women and anti-education," claims Ahmad Rashid, a researcher. A sequence of killings, murdered people hung from trees, grave digging, and degradation of the dead preceded the agreement. Ultimately, it increased the fanatics.

In any issue, it believes that Sufi Muhammad can also bring stability to Swat and openly denounce militants and battle with government forces as anti-Islamic. He, on the other hand, raised new allegations and criticized the administration and security forces (Rome, 2011).

**POST-PEACE AGREEMENT DAYS - 2009**

From 2006 to April 2009, Fazlullah and the Swat Taliban governed the population via their FM station. Not only did the broadcasts reflect the residents' devotion, but they also empowered the Swat Taliban to expand their influence and maintain control over Swat and portions of Dir, Shangla, and Malakand (Bokhari, 2009).

Another incident in the days following the peace agreement was the media release of an old video footage by women activists Samar Minallah depicting the Taliban lashing out at a girl for supposed immorality. Although this was not the only instance of accused culprits being beaten, there were reportedly a few instances of women and men being beaten for supposedly committing various offences. Both the national and international media used the footage and spread vehement anti-peace propaganda. Interestingly, a year later, state authorities stated that they learned from captured criminals that the video was fabricated and produced at the request of some non-state actors for which they were compensated handsomely in order to tarnish Pakistan (Rome, 2011).

In the post-peace era The Taliban marched in the direction of Buner and Dir. Interestingly, the matter took a critical turn and became more sensationalized when Fazlur Rehman (Amir of Jamiat ulu lama-e-Islam) declared on the floor of the national house that the Taliban have

reached Tarbela and that the Taliban are only separated from Islamabad by the Margala hills. According to the administration, the raids in Buner and Dir violated the terms of the peace deal. Sufi Muhammad, on the other hand, argued that by initiating the operation, "the government breached the Swat peace deal" (Rabia, 2011). Most of the members of the Taliban were of the opinion that the "peace accord with the then NWFP administration has been effectively annulled, and we are awaiting Maulana Sufi Muhammad's decision" (Rana, 2011).

### **ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE**

The APC, with representatives from 43 key political and religious organizations, broadly discussed the global crisis in parts of the NWFP due to militants and radicals' activities, forcing the administration to active military operations. It's one of those odd occasions in the country's politics when almost all the politicians and political parties assembled at the Prime Minister's House to share their opinion. It is one of the country's more critical consequences since before the collapse of Dhaka, and trying to reach an agreement on how to face and solve the problem (Dawn, 2009).

After exhausting all other alternatives, such as the so-called Nizam-i-Adl law, many senior leaders favored the state's plan to start the military action. The military intervention was essential, Prime Minister Gilani said to political elites, since terrorists failed to recognize the state's authority, mistreated innocent citizens, and ruined their lives. The meeting flatly denied that Pakistan's nuclear bombs would fall on the shoulders of extremists, instead of meeting claiming that Pakistan's nuclear facilities are safe and that anybody who dares to deal will bear the consequences (Khan, 2012).

Finally, it considers that organizing the army was in the interest of the country. In a 16-point resolution approved a plan, APC promised to work with unify the party in the context of Swat insurgency, strive for the welfare of people's lives, protect the humans overall, and confront terrorists sectarianism and extremism cooperatively.

### **THE DUAL FACE OF SO –CALLED SWAT TALIBAN**

Swat peace agreement offered Islamists with a good opportunity to realize a long-held aim to implement Islamic law in the Malakand region. When various acts of violence in Swat resulted in the death and kidnapping of security forces, it provided ammunition for anti-Taliban elements to claim that the militants had malign intentions and that Islamic regulations (Sharia) were merely a cover for their so-called objectives (Haq, 2009).

The situation deteriorated when armed militants refused to close checkpoints and committed acts of vandalism and hooliganism in order to delay the restoration of government authority in Swat. Armed militants from Swat infiltrated adjoining Lower Dir and took control after frightening people, looting their homes, and forcing many to escape. They subsequently relocated to Buner and began consolidating their positions through a combination of flexible and coercive techniques (Orakzai, 2011).

Washington, as well as others in Pakistan such as Maulana Fazlur Rehman, warned that the Taliban were marching towards Islamabad and would soon seize control. The militants conducted frenzied military preparations and mass recruitment, indicating that they had no intention of abiding by the provisions of the peace deal. The provincial government of the time, the ANP, was forced to call the military to intervene. When the troops reached Lower Dir on 25 April 2009, they encountered intense opposition from militants, the majority of whom were Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Afghans. They were forced out and resisted the soldiers with tenacity. By the time the army approached Swat, the true nature of the Taliban had been revealed (Malak, 2013).

On May 16, 2009, the Mushaikh Council convened a convention at which Ulema and Mushaikh from all sects expressed their unwavering support for the army and criticized the Taliban's cruel conduct, which tarnished Islam's reputation. Additionally, representatives from all political parties, religious scholars, and numerous groups spoke in favour of a military intervention. However, Sufi Muhammad's interview with Salim Safi, in which he declared that democracy, parliament, and the judiciary are incompatible with Islam's fundamental character. This has contributed to a sea change in public perception. A macabre video clip of the Taliban beheading troops elicited widespread revulsion (Hussain, 2013).

Certain terrible atrocities such as school burnings, suicide attacks on mosques, funerals, and Imam Bargahs, and brutal beheadings of innocent people. Indeed, those were unrelenting tactics used to scare and coerce people into joining the Taliban. To begin, each conscript was compensated with excellent wages and food (Saddique, 2010).

As the civil administration and police became ineffective, the populace was largely abandoned to the militants, who compelled them to accept their orders unconditionally. Fazlullah and the Taliban possessed an abundance of cash, modern weaponry, ammunition, explosives, mines, and electronic equipment, all of which were liberally supplied by the CIA, RAW, and Mossad. Additionally, money was collected through kidnapping for ransom, extortion of the wealthy, drug trafficking, and the timber trade. Trained men, predominantly Tajik, Uzbek, Afghan, Chechen, and Arab extremists, had aided Fazlullah with technical and labour support. They were supposed to use innocent people as human shields. They maintained a strategic alliance with the TTP, which was led by Baithullah (Saddique, 2010).

The Taliban established their own training camps in Peuchar, upper Swat, and utilized different training means to instill instruction in local recruits. They also established makeshift bomb manufacturing factories. Swat terrorists had the same level of training, motivation, and equipment as army forces.

Fazlullah and his miscreants used one of their campaigns to block polio vaccinations across Pakistan. Fazlullah maintained that it was a plot orchestrated by Jews and Christians to stunt the rise of the Muslim population. They also attempted to destroy centuries-old Buddha sculptures and prehistoric rock carvings in the Swat valley in 2007 (Zahid, 2012).

**THE FINAL BLOW IN SWAT- THE OPERATION RAH-E- RAST**

The security forces' operation was aimed at clearing the valley of insurgents. On 28th March 2009, the advance and encounter combat began in Buner. Whereas the first fight in Dir occurred at Hayaseri on 3rd May 2009, resulting in the death of a number of security officers. On 14 May 2009, another tank squadron was destroyed in Dir. Both sides suffered significant losses in Buner as well (Rahman, 2011).

Swat's hilly terrain favoured TTS rebels and made military operations difficult. When the SSG (Special Support Group) landed in Peochar, security troops attacked Fazlullah's headquarters. The security forces discovered large training facilities, bomb-making factories, a 100-foot-long tunnel, and a massive cache of weapons and ammunition. The militants were surrounded on four sides by security troops in Dir, Buner, Peochar, and Shangla. From Khwazakhela, government forces launched an attack on Matta and Durishkhela, destroying the Taliban training centre (Rahi, 2011).

Chakdara was secured on its way to Barikot, and all Taliban entry and escape points were locked. Security forces subsequently advanced from several directions towards Takhtaband, Matta, Tarrano, and Kabal, clearing the majority of Swat (Rahi, 2011).

Security forces entered Mingora following the capture of Malam Jaba (a ski resort). After encountering stiff opposition in Kabal, security troops captured Charbagh, Ser Taligram, and Kanju. Totano Bandai, Deolai, and Sirsinai were also liberated from terrorists following severe battle. Taliban had previously erected their so-called court of justice in Deolai, which was ultimately demolished by government forces. On 22nd June 2009, security forces conquered Sakhra and Beha valleys in the north, which were considered terrorist strongholds.

**CONTROL OVER MINGORA**

Small detachments of SSG assaulted the city in unison with the army. On May 2, they invaded Mingora, initiating the most critical phase of Military Operation Rah-e-Rast. There was a ferocious street brawl that continued street after street. The Taliban operated from bunkers constructed within hotels. The battle took place primarily in a famous Green Chowk and in the surrounding streets (Rana, 2011). Pakistan's military seized entire control of Mingora. It was a decisive triumph over the Taliban. Following the battle, a conflict ensued for a time but eventually came to a stop (Rahi, 2011).

**ENDS OF THE OPERATION RAH-E-RAST**

The objectives of the operation Rah-e- Rast were effectively accomplished, including the eradication of the Taliban leadership and control of the valley of Swat's major cities and villages. Mingora, the capital city, was seized earlier than predicted by the army. Due to the Taliban's command, communication, and training network being disrupted in Swat, the remaining terrorists dispersed into the mountains or fled to nearby locations. For a time, the militants banded together, but they were eventually defeated (Haq, 2009).

Operation Rah-e-Rast showed foreign involvement in Swat's lawlessness. Taliban insurgents have been seized with a large quantity of weapons and ammunition of American, Russian, Indian, and Israeli provenance. Additionally, currency from various nations like as India, Afghanistan, and the United States has been discovered from dead and arrested combatants (Mashriq, 2009).

Pakistani security forces protected the whole Swat valley, Buner, and a large portion of the lower Dir, while the local populace battled the Taliban in upper Dir. The state's authority was restored, and the local populace returned to their homes following the restoration of infrastructure and civil administration (Rabia, 2011).

Finally, Prime Minister Sayyed Yousaf Raza Gillani announced that the army operation in Malakand Division had concluded. The IDPs will now be returned to their homes with dignity, and the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the area will begin shortly in a transparent way involving all stakeholders (Daily Times, 2009).

### **SWAT IN THE AFTERMATH OF CONFLICT**

The process of peace building began immediately after the IDPs returned in late August 2009. By the end of May 2010, security forces had consolidated control over the whole valley and established government writ. Early on, reconstruction was a primary concern, as the battle wreaked havoc on private and public property and infrastructure (Rana, 2011).

Another pressing need and demand of the time was the development of a just and impartial judiciary. Perpetual peace in the valley was contingent on the government's quickness and dedication to rehabilitation, as well as its responsiveness to the concerns of local communities. However, the government's response has been less consistent than it should have been. The reconstruction effort began over a year after the battle, in April 2010. For example, the administration had established the groundwork for 20 schools by April 2010, despite the fact that approximately 137 schools had been destroyed during the conflict (Zafar, 2011).

Later, the civil administration was restored, and the judiciary was improved, including the hiring of extra magistrates and the setting of a timeframe for adjudicating cases. Additionally, the number of cases decreased from 18,000 to 5,000 during the course of the year. Additionally, the government established a circuit bench of the high court (Dar-ul-Qaza) in Fiza Ghat, in the vicinity of Mingora city, to facilitate the administration of justice (Majeed, 2016).

People's grievances have escalated in the post-conflict period. Following the loss assessment, an insufficient quantity of rupees was announced, namely Rs 160,000 for partially damaged structures and Rs 400,000 for entirely damaged buildings. No compensation was offered for household items. During search activities, security forces were quite harsh with locals, and they showed little regard for *Pakhtun* norms (2011, Orakzai).

Throughout the operation, security forces commandeered a large number of private dwellings and commercial buildings, forcing owners to rent space; on the other hand, the military did not charge them a single penny. Local residents' buildings, which housed the security troops, were harmed, escalating public outrage and suspicion of the security forces (Fazal, 2011).

Other factors that contributed to the development of negative sentiments toward the government and security forces, particularly the Pakistan army, included the ruthless clearing of trees from roadside and path edges, the prohibition of certain crops such as maize cultivation in certain areas, and unannounced regular curfews in various parts of Swat. One of the brutal tasks assigned to the Pakistani army was to make it mandatory for residents in the majority of areas to wear security passes of various colors around their necks (Khan, 2012).

Local lashkars and village Defense Committees (VDCs) were established following the conflict. As the name implies, VDCs were incorporated into villages. At the village level, distinguished members were chosen. VDC's primary function was to coordinate with security personnel. VDCs continue to operate in Swat, bridging the gap between civil society and the armed forces (Hussain, 2011).

## CONCLUSION

Operation Rah-e- Rast was the last option for the security forces of Pakistan against militants in Swat and Malakand. Taliban under the supervision of Fazlullah and Sufi Muhammad had promoted their own account of Islam, which was based on looting, disgracing, kidnapping and slaughtering. The militants in Swat were not actually attached with the true spirit of Islam. Islamic principles were only used for their own account of like and dislike. In mid-2009 the operation Rah-e- Rast proved the decisive encounter against Fazlullah and his so-called Talibanization. The main centre of this operation was Swat, particularly the areas of Mingora, Peochar, Mamdherai, Ser Taligram and tehsil Kabal. Apart from Swat, operation Rah-e- Rast was also launched in the districts of Dir, Buner and Shangla. By this operation the security forces completely dismantled the hideouts of Taliban in Swat and the adjacent districts.

By June 29, 2009, the operation had been linked at a vital junction and with the capture of the Biha valley in the north and Shamoza in the west; the terrorists' principal strongholds had been removed. Their command structure was completely decimated, their training facilities were demolished, their recruits were assassinated or fled, and their ammo stockpiles and headquarters were destroyed in every direction. Fazlullah and other Taliban commanders on the run have escaped to Afghanistan. Swat's population had endured numerous hardships; approximately 2.7 million Swat residents were internally displaced. Swat's infrastructure had been entirely destroyed. Khans, Maliks, and political figures, particularly the members of ANP were targeted on priority basis. The sacrifices of the common people could not be overlooked in this operation. Swat is now entirely peaceful and there is no sign of extremist and militants.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Education is the most important element against extremism. Through relevant, inclusive, applied and handy education we can overcome terrorism and extremism.
- Durable laws and policies should be enacted in such way to end all kind of discrimination, corruption and nepotism.
- The government should give priority to address the admissible demands upraised by various clusters before escalating into violence.
- Creation of job opportunities, skill improvement and income generation programs should be provided to the youth in the militant affected areas.
- All madaris in Malakand division should be registered.
- All mosques should be managed by an administrative committee composed of the nearby residents.
- Fulfillment of speedy and easy justice to the resident of Swat and Malakand division.

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